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Abstract
As in Roemer (1982, chapter 1), this paper considers a simple interna-
tional trade model and examines the existence and characterization of free
trade equilibria involving the unequal exchange of labor (UE). The paper
provides an almost complete characterization of the domain of economies in
which free trade equilibria with incomplete specialization exist. Moreover,
the necessary and sufficient conditions for free trade equilibrium to involve
UE is identified. It suggests that the emergence of free trade equilibria with
UE cannot be entailed by the competitive mechanism of markets and un-
equal distribution of wealth alone, but might be understood as an outcome
of equilibrium selection on the basis of Nash bargaining between rich and
poor nations.
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1 Introduction
Understanding why some countries in the world economy are so rich while
some are so poor is one of the most important issues in economics, as there
are large inequalities in income per capita and output per worker across coun-
tries, increasing since 1820.1 Regarding this issue, the so-called dependence
school recognizes the emergence of development and underdevelopment in the
capitalistic world system as a product of exploitative relations between rich
and poor nations. For instance, among others, Emmanuel (1972) discusses
the generation of unequal exchange (UE) between rich and poor nations due
to the core-periphery structure of international economies.2 He argued, that
in the world economy characterized by customary disparity in wage rates
among developed and undeveloped nations, the international trade of com-
modities and capital mobility across nations cause the transfer of surplus
labor from poor nations with lower capital-labor rations to wealthy nations
with higher capital-labor ratios, which results in the impoverishment of poor
nations and the enrichment of wealthy ones.
Samuelson (1976) argues that Emmanuel’s theory of UE is inconsistent
with the theory of comparative advantage, which implies the existence of mu-
tual gain from trade. However, at best, his criticism refutes the second claim
of the theory and not the first, which illustrates a mechanism for generating
UE. Indeed, the generation of UE might be compatible with mutual gains
from trade; as Marx (1968, chapter 20, (e)) notes, “a richer country exploits
a poorer one, even when the latter benefits from the exchange.” Marx’s ob-
servation suggests that imperfectly competitive exchange conditions, such as
an institutionalized wage disparity, are not an essential source of UE, though
they may exacerbate the UE feature of international economies.
Roemer (1982, chapter 1; 1983) provides a coherent formal analysis of the
generation of UE using simple models of perfectly competitive markets. He
1For instance, see Acemoglu (2009, Chapter 1).
2The question of unequal exchange in international trade has been historically argued,
as Marx (1954, chapter 20) explains exploitation among nations as a consequence of the
disparity in wage rates, due to differences in the technologies available to them.
2
considers free trade equilibria in international economies where all nations
have identical technology and labor supply but unequal capital-labor ratios,
and there are international markets for commodities but not capital nor labor.
His main purpose is to exhibit in as simple a framework as possible, that
inequality of capital endowments among nations and competitive markets
are sufficient institutions for an exploitative UE, and the existence of UE is
compatible with the presence of mutual gains from trade.
However, there remain many unexamined issues in characterizing the es-
sential mechanism giving rise to UE in competitive international economies.
Indeed, though in Roemer (1982, chapter 1), the existence of UE is discussed
in the simplest model of an economy with labor-minimizing agents, it is ar-
gued by only providing a numerical example. In Roemer (1983, Theorem
1), a simple model of international economies is given in which each nation’s
objective is to maximize the monetary value of its own capital, and only
equilibria featuring complete specialization are analyzed.3
In this paper, sharing the same perspective as Marx (1968, chapter 20,
(e)) and Roemer (1982, chapter 1; 1983), we consider a simple model of
competitive international trade in which all nations have the same technol-
ogy and population size as well as domestic labor and capital markets, but
only commodity markets are international in scope.4 On this basis, we pro-
vide a more comprehensive analysis of the conditions giving rise to UE in
international economies. Our model follows Roemer’s in assuming Leontief
technology, with no choice among techniques or technical change, and com-
mon welfare functions, our goal being to show how UE might arise even
without differences in preferences for leisure and commodity consumption.5
3That is, each nation is specialized toward production activities at a proper subset of all
sectors in equilibrium; therefore, each nation’s domestic wage rate and interest rate differ.
In such an equilibrium, it is shown that the nation with zero wage rate is UE exploited,
and the nation with zero interest rate is UE exploiting.
4This feature is also shared with the basic model of the standard international trade
theory a la Heckscher-Ohlin-Samuelson. This setting is reasonable, at least for discussing
a universal long-run feature of free trade equilibria, since any (advanced) knowledge of
technology can be dispersed across nations and becomes common in the long run.
5Assuming the common welfare function of all nations is consistent with a shared view
on exploitation, that an unequal exchange transfer of products due only to differences in
preferences for income and leisure is not unjustly exploitative, as Cohen (1995) argues.
This is also consistent with the standard approach of international trade theory, in that it
argues the generation of international division of labor and the mutual gain from trading,
even without assuming differential preferences among traders.
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The welfare function presumed in this paper implies that, as in Roemer
(1982, chapter 1), all nations are primarily concerned about their citizens’
enjoyment of free hours (or leisure time), given that a common subsistence
consumption bundle necessary for the citizens’ survival is ensured. This
model, which we hereafter call a subsistence international economy, allows
us to analyze competitive international exchange outcomes with the simpli-
fication that consumption bundles are insensitive to relative price changes in
commodity prices (all nations’ citizens always consume the subsistence com-
modity bundle only)6, but competitive exchange of commodities will still
emerge among nations, due to the division of labor in their production activ-
ities. Moreover, whether consumption demand is sensitive to price changes
is not essential for the main purpose of this paper. The presumption of
subsistence international economies also allows us to examine the generation
of UE independently of the complicated issues involved by capital accumula-
tion, since as shown later in Section 2, any equilibrium in such economies
is characterized by a stationary path with no capital accumulation. To dis-
cuss the generation of UE even though the capitalistic motivation of capital
accumulation is lacking, it is opportune to presume such economies.
While this paper’s model is thus identical to those of Roemer (1982, chap-
ter 1; 1983) in certain core respect, it considers some important extensions of
his framework. Firstly, unlike Roemer (1982, chapter 1; 1983), we will focus
on an equilibrium where every nation engages in activities of all production
sectors (equilibrium with incomplete specialization, hereafter), and provide an
almost complete characterization for the existence of that equilibrium involv-
ing UE. Since here, all nations can access the common Leontief production
technique, unlike the standard Ricardian model of international trade, in-
complete specialization would be a generic feature of free trade equilibrium.
Then, as Theorem 1 of this paper shows, factor price equalization emerges
in equilibria with incomplete specialization, even though each nation’s prices
of labor and capital are determined via its domestic factor markets. Since
neither Marx (1954), Emmanuel (1972), nor Roemer (1982, chapter 1; 1983)
focuses on such an equilibrium for the subject of UE-generation, the main
results in this paper offer a new perspective on conditions giving rise to UE
in international trade.
6It does not imply that the aggregate demand for each commodity is insensitive to
any price change in such economies, since the aggregate demand consists of not only the
aggregate consumption demand but also the aggregate demand for that commodity used
as a capital good for the next period of production.
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Indeed, the first main result characterizes the domain of subsistence
economies where free trade equilibrium with incomplete specialization ex-
ists. The second main result shows that for any subsistence economy, free
trade equilibrium with incomplete specialization involves UE if and only if
the initial endowments of financial capital among nations are unequal and
the equilibrium prices of commodities are not labor-value pricing (See Corol-
lary 1). To see the implications of these results, subsistence economies should
be classified into two types. The first type refers to subsistence economies
with excessive social endowments of capital stocks. In this case, every in-
completely specialized equilibrium involves labor-value pricing and hence no
UE, regardless of whether the distribution of financial capital is unequal or
not (See Theorem 4).
The second type refers to subsistence economies with non-excessive so-
cial endowments of capital stocks. In this case, we may say that such an
economy entails essential technical differences among sectors if and only if
sectoral capital-labor ratios are not equalized in some equilibrium of that
economy. Furthermore, the latter condition holds if and only if the unique
Frobenius eigenvector of the Leontief matrix of material input coefficients
and the vector of the labor input coefficients are linearly independent (See
Lemma 1). Since the unique Frobenius eigenvector of the Leontief matrix and
the vector of the labor input coefficients are data regarding the economy’s
production technology, we can check if each such economy entails essential
technical differences among sectors, prior to any equilibrium analysis. Then,
if an economy with non-excessive capital stocks also features no essential
technical difference among sectors, no equilibrium characterized by UE ex-
ists (See Theorem 2).
Finally, if an economy with non-excessive capital stocks entails essential
technical differences among sectors, we can identify a large domain of initial
endowments of financial capital in which the existence of free trade equilibria
with incomplete specialization is ensured. Moreover, each such equilibrium
involves UE if and only if financial capital is unequally distributed and the
corresponding equilibrium price vector entails a positive interest rate (See
Theorem 3). Note that an equilibrium price vector with a positive interest
rate in such an economy is not labor-value pricing.
Thus, the main results suggest that the existence of UE-Equilibria is
secured only in economies with non-excessive capital stocks and essential
technical differences among sectors. Even within the class of such economies,
however, the inequality of capital endowments among nations and competi-
5
tive markets alone are insufficient for the realization of an UE-Equilibrium,
unlike the main message of Roemer (1982, Chapter 1). This is because free
trade equilibria are generically indeterminate in such economies, and so the
two institutions alone cannot rule out the realizability of the equilibrium with
labor-value pricing. Indeed, in such an economy, the international division of
labor occurs even under the equilibrium with labor-value pricing: a wealth-
ier nation is specialized in more capital-intensive production activity while a
poorer one in a more labor-intensive activity, through their own optimizing
behavior. However, it does not involve the lower labor supply of the former
than that of the latter, whenever the equilibrium is labor-value pricing.
Given such results, we provide a counterfactual scenario to realize UE in
free trade equilibria. A counterfactual bargaining among nations is consid-
ered on the selection of an equilibrium price vector from the set of equilibria.
In such bargaining, we observe the existence of an asymmetric power struc-
ture among nations due to the unequal distribution of financial capital, which
would play a crucial role in eliminating the realization of equilibrium with
labor-value pricing. As discussed later, this additional institution would also
give us a philosophical explanation as to why international trade character-
ized by UE might reasonably be understood as exploitative.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 presents the
basic model and an equilibrium notion. Section 3 defines the formulation of
exploitation as UE. Section 4 discusses the existence and characterization of
free trade equilibria with and without UE. Finally, Section 5 concludes the
paper.
2 A Basic Model
Let N be the set of agents (nations), with cardinality N ; there are n = 2
commodities. An economy comprises a set of agents N = {1, .., N}, with
a generic element ν ∈ N , and n types of (purely private) commodities are
transferable in the market. The production technology, commonly accessible
by any agent, is represented by a Leontief production technique (A,L), where
A is an n×n non-negative square matrix of the material input coefficients and
L is a 1×n positive vector of the labor input coefficients. Here, A is assumed
to be productive and indecomposable.7 For the sake of simplicity, let us
7Let K be the index set of A’s dimension. Then, A is said to be decomposable if there
is a pair of I and J such that K = I ∪J , I ∩J = ∅, I, J 6= ∅, and aij = 0 for i ∈ I, j ∈ J .
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assume that for each production period, the maximal amount of labor supply
by every agent is equal to unity, and there is no differences in labor skills
(human capital) among agents. Let b ∈ Rn++ be the subsistence consumption
bundle that every citizen in every nation must consume for his/her survival
in one period of production, regardless of whether he/she supplies labor.
For simplicity, each nation also has the same population size, normalized to
unity. Let ω ∈ Rn++ be the world endowments of material capital goods at
the beginning of the initial period of production.
Assume ω = A [I −A]−1 (Nb) and L [I −A]−1 (Nb) < N .8 Note that
A [I −A]−1 (Nb) represents the minimal level of capital stocks necessary for
the survival of the economy. Both assumptions imply that the production
of aggregate amount of subsistence consumption bundles is technologically
feasible in this economy. Moreover, assume ω ≤ A [I −A]−1 (Nb) + Nb,
which implies a non-free lunch in the initial period. Every national economy
has the common consumption space C ≡
©
c ∈ Rn+ | c = b
ª
× [0, 1] and the
common welfare function u : C → R, defined as follows: for each (c, l) ∈ C,
u (c, l) = 1− l.
That is, no nation is concerned about an increase in consumption goods
beyond the subsistence level b, but nations evaluate their social welfare in
terms of the increase in free hours (leisure time), once b is guaranteed. An
international economy is thus defined by the profile hN , (A,L, u) ,ωi, which
we call a subsistence (international) economic environment.
The time structure of production is such that the capital goods available
in the present period of production cannot exceed the amount of capital goods
accumulated by the end of the preceding period of production. Furthermore,
(1) Given the market prices pt−1 ≥ 0 at the beginning of period t, each
nation ν ∈ N purchases under the constraint of its wealth endowment pt−1ωνt ,
capital goods Axνt as production inputs in the present period. Each nation
also purchases commodities δνt to sell, for speculative purposes, at the end of
the present period.
If A is indecomposable, then it has at least one non-zero off-diagonal entry in every row
and column.
8For all vectors x = (x1, x2, . . . , xn) and y = (y1, y2, . . . , yn) ∈ Rn, x = y if and only
if xi = yi (i = 1, 2, . . . , n); x ≥ y if and only if x = y and x 6= y; x > y if and only if
xi > yi (i = 1, 2, . . . , n).
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(2) Each nation is engaged in production activity of period t by inputting
labor Lxνt and the purchased capital goods Ax
ν
t .
(3) The production activity is completed and xνt is the output at the end
of this period. Then, in goods markets with market prices pt ≥ 0, each
nation earns revenue (ptx
ν
t + ptδνt ) derived from output xνt , as well as the
speculative commodity bundle δνt . The nation uses this revenue to purchase
the bundle b for consumption at the end of this period, and capital stock
ωνt+1 for production in the next period. Therefore, the wealth endowment
carried over to the next period t+ 1 is ptωνt+1.
Note that the above three-stage time structure of production is assumed
to simply describe the aggregated economic actions of a nation ν ∈ N , result-
ing from the optimization decisions of all its citizens. Moreover, though the
optimization decisions internal to each nation are not specified, we implicitly
assume that each nation ν ∈ N is the representative agent of all its citizens,9
and citizens exchange their production factors within the territory in domes-
tic factor markets; therefore, labor is traded in a given period t within a given
nation at its domestic wage rate wνt , while capital is borrowed and lent within
the nation by its domestic interest rate rνt at period t. Thus, in equilibrium
with the domestic wage rate and interest rate in period t, (wνt , r
ν
t ) ≥ (0, 0),
the total net revenue from production activity ptx
ν
t − pt−1Axνt of nation ν
is decomposed exhaustively into total wage income wνt Lx
ν
t and total interest
income rνt pt−1Ax
ν
t through the domestic market.
10
Therefore, given a price system
¡
{pt−1, pt} ; (wνt , r
ν
t )ν∈N
¢
, in period t, each
nation ν ∈ N solves the following (aggregated) optimization program (MP νt ):
(MP νt ) min
xνt ,δνt ,ωνt+1∈Rn+
lνt
subject to ptx
ν
t + ptδνt = ptb+ ptωνt+1;
ptx
ν
t − pt−1Axνt = wνt Lxνt + rνt pt−1Axνt ;
lνt = Lx
ν
t 5 1;
pt−1δνt + pt−1Axνt = pt−1ωνt ;
ptωνt+1 = pt−1ωνt .
9The welfare function of subsistence economies is consistent with this representative
agent assumption, since it fulfills the homotheticity.
10Such a setting of domestic markets is shared with the standard Heckscher-Ohlin model
of international trade, as well as the model by Roemer (1982, chapter 1; 1983).
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We denote the set of solutions to the optimization program (MP νt ) of each
nation ν, in period t by Oνt
¡
{pt−1, pt} ; (wνt , r
ν
t )ν∈N
¢
.
For simplicity, we focus on the subset of equilibria in which prices re-
main constant over time, i.e., pt = pt+1 = p
∗. In this case, nations are
indifferent to the selection of speculative commodity bundle δνt , whenever
the budget constraint is met. Moreover, in this case, any ωνt+1 ∈ Rn+ sat-
isfying p∗ωνt+1 = p∗ωνt is an optimal selection, and p∗x∗νt − p∗Ax∗νt = p∗b
holds at
¡
x∗νt , δνt ,ωνt+1
¢
∈ Oνt
¡
p∗; (wν∗t , r
ν∗
t )ν∈N
¢
for any δνt ,ωνt+1 ∈ Rn+ satis-
fying p∗δνt + p∗Ax∗νt = p∗ωνt = p∗ωνt+1. Because of these, we can remove the
elements δνt ,ωνt+1 from Oνt
¡
p∗; (wν∗t , r
ν∗
t )ν∈N
¢
.
Definition 1: A reproducible solution (RS) for a subsistence economy hN , (A,L, u) , (ων0)ν∈N i
in period t is a price vector
¡
p∗; (wν∗t , r
ν∗
t )ν∈N
¢
and an associated profile of
actions (x∗νt )ν∈N such that for any t:
(i) for each ν ∈ N , x∗νt ∈ Oνt
¡
p∗; (wν∗t , r
ν∗
t )ν∈N
¢
holds;
(ii) Nb+
P
ν∈N ωνt+1 5
P
ν∈N x
∗ν
t ;
(iii) A
¡P
ν∈N x
∗ν
t
¢
5
P
ν∈N ωνt ; and
(iv)
P
ν∈N ωνt+1 =
P
ν∈N ωνt .
Definition 1 states that in an RS, taking the price system
¡
p∗; (wν∗t , r
ν∗
t )ν∈N
¢
,
every nation chooses its own optimal action in each period (condition (i)); ag-
gregate gross outputs are sufficient to meet aggregate demand of subsistence
consumption bundles in each period, and aggregate capital stock invested
for the next period (condition (ii)); aggregate activities of production are
feasible under the stock of capital goods in each period (condition (iii)); and
aggregate capital endowment
P
ν∈N ωνt in each period is at least reproduced
and carried over for production in the next period (condition (iv)). Note that
according to conditions (ii), (iii), and (iv) of Definition 1,
(ii’)
P
ν∈N x
∗ν
t −A
¡P
ν∈N x
∗ν
t
¢
= Nb.
Therefore, in every period t, aggregate net outputs are sufficient to meet
aggregate demand of the subsistence consumption bundles.
We next show that any allocation at an RS is Pareto efficient. From
this property, we can observe that any equilibrium allocation associated with
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any RS does not entail any capital accumulation; it simply allows the sim-
ple reproduction of the initial level of capital stocks ω, at each period of
production. As a preliminary step, let us define:
Definition 2: Given a subsistence economy without a labor or capital mar-
ket hN , (A,L, u) ,ωti,
¡
(xνt )ν∈N ,ωt+1
¢
∈ RnN+ ×Rn+, is a feasible allocation in
period t if and only if:
(1)
P
ν∈N x
ν
t = Nb+ ωt+1;
(2) A
¡P
ν∈N x
ν
t
¢
5 ωt;
(3) ωt+1 = ωt; and
(4) Lxνt ∈ [0, 1] (∀ν ∈ N ).
That is, a feasible allocation at each period is a profile of each nation’s
production activity vector (xνt )ν∈N , and a vector of commodities ωt+1 for
replacing as capital used in the next period, satisfying the same conditions
as those of Definition 1(ii), (iii), and (iv).
Definition 3: Given a subsistence economy without a labor or capital mar-
ket hN , (A,L, u) ,ωti,
¡
(xνt )ν∈N ,ωt+1
¢
∈ RnN+ ×Rn+ is a Pareto efficient allo-
cation in period t if and only if it is feasible, and there is no other feasible allo-
cation
¡
(x0ν)ν∈N ,ω0t+1
¢
∈ RnN+ ×Rn+ such that L
¡P
ν∈N x
0ν
t
¢
< L
¡P
ν∈N x
ν
t
¢
.
That is, a feasible allocation at each period is Pareto efficient if and only if
there is no other feasible allocation whose aggregate labor supply is less than
that of this allocation. Note that the latter condition is equivalent to the stan-
dard condition of Pareto non-improvement in subsistence economies. More-
over, given ω = A [I −A]−1 (Nb), any Pareto efficient allocation ¡(xνt )ν∈N ,ωt+1¢
in period t is characterized by ωt+1 = ω,
¡P
ν∈N x
ν
t
¢
= [I −A]−1 (Nb), and
L
¡P
ν∈N x
ν
t
¢
= Nvb, where v ≡ L [I −A]−1.
Proposition 1: Given an economy hN , (A,L, u) , (ων0)ν∈N i with
P
ν∈N ων0 =
ω, let hp; (wνt , rνt )ν∈N , (xνt )ν∈N i be an RS in period t. Then, (xνt )ν∈N is Pareto
efficient.
The proofs of all formal results are in the Appendix. Note that, as shown in
the proof of Proposition 1, ωt+1 = ωt holds for any RS, which implies that
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capital goods are not accumulated but simply replenished period by period
in any RS.
In what follows, we devote special attention to the subset of RSs with
incomplete specialization, in which each ν ∈ N produces all commodities:11
Definition 4: An RS with incomplete specialization for a subsistence econ-
omy hN , (A,L, u) , (ων0)ν∈N i in period t is an RS hp∗; (wν∗t , rν∗t )ν∈N , (x∗νt )ν∈N i,
such that for each ν ∈ N , x∗νt ∈ Rn++ holds.
At an RS with incomplete specialization, p∗ = (1 + rν∗t ) p
∗A+wν∗t L holds for
every ν ∈ N because x∗νt > 0. Therefore, p∗ > 0 since L > 0.
The following theorem establishes that factor prices are cross-nationally
equalized in equilibria characterized by incomplete specialization.
Theorem 1 [Factor Price Equalization]: Given an economy hN , (A,L, u) , (ων0)ν∈N i,
let hp∗; (wν∗t , r
ν∗
t ) , (x
∗ν
t )ν∈N i be an RS with incomplete specialization. Sup-
pose that there is at least one pair of i, j = 1, . . . , n, such that i 6= j and
p∗Aei
Li
6= p
∗Aej
Lj
, where ei denotes the i-th unit vector. Then, (w
ν∗
t , r
ν∗
t ) =¡
wν
0∗
t , r
ν0∗
t
¢
for all ν, ν 0 ∈ N .
That is, the equalization of wages and interest rates among nations emerges in
any RS with incomplete specialization, even though no international market
for capital and labor exists. By utilizing this property, the following analysis
on the existence of UE will provide a new observation on the UE-generation
mechanism.
3 Exploitation as UE
By noting that condition (ii) of Definition 1 is reduced to (ii0), as shown in the
previous section, the notion of labor exploitation in subsistence international
economies is formally defined as follows:
Definition 5: For any subsistence economy
­
N , (A,L, u) , (ων0)ν∈N
®
, let
11For a typical international economic environment with two commodities, the equilib-
rium notion of incomplete specialization is naturally defined such that each nation produces
both commodities. When considering the case with three or more types of commodities,
we may have two extensions of the incomplete specialization notion: one that each nation
produces all commodities and the other that each nation produces at least two types of
commodities. In this paper, we adopt the former extension.
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­
p∗; (wν∗t , r
ν∗
t )ν∈N , (x
∗ν
t )ν∈N
®
be an RS in period t. Then, the amount of
socially necessary labor required to produce b as a net output is
1
N
L
ÃX
ν∈N
x∗νt
!
= vb = L [I −A]−1 b,
where v = L [I −A]−1 is called the labor value vector. Moreover, for each
nation ν ∈ N , the supply of labor hours to earn revenue p∗b for its own
survival is Lx∗ν, which implies
ν is an exploiting nation⇐⇒ Lx∗ν < vb;
ν is an exploited nation⇐⇒ Lx∗ν > vb.
Denote the sets of exploiters and exploited respectively byN ter and N ted.
Definition 6 [Roemer (1982, Definitions 1.3 and 1.4)]: For any subsistence
economy
­
N , (A,L, u) , (ων0)ν∈N
®
, an RS in period t,
­
p∗; (wν∗t , r
ν∗
t )ν∈N , (x
∗ν
t )ν∈N
®
,
is inegalitarian if and only if N ter 6= ∅ and N ted 6= ∅.
Thus, if an RS in period t is inegalitarian, it involves UE of labor. By con-
trast, we can state that for any subsistence economy
­
N , (A,L, u) , (ων0)ν∈N
®
,
an RS in period t,
­
p∗; (wν∗t , r
ν∗
t )ν∈N , (x
∗ν
t )ν∈N
®
is egalitarian if and only if
Lx∗νt = Lx
∗ν0
t for all ν, ν 0 ∈ N .
Definition 5 presents a standard Okishio (1963)-Morishima (1973) form of
exploitation as UE in subsistence economies with simple Leontief production
techniques. On the contrary, if a more general class of production economies
is considered, many alternative definitions of exploitation have been proposed
other than the Okishio-Morishima form, as discussed by Veneziani and Yoshi-
hara (2014; 2015), Yoshihara (2010; 2015), and Yoshihara and Veneziani
(2009). However, all such alternative exploitation forms are reduced to De-
finition 5 within the restricted class of subsistence economies with simple
Leontief production techniques. Therefore, the following analysis on the ex-
istence and characterization of inegalitarian RSs is free from debate on the
proper definitions of labor exploitation.
Though Definition 6 is consistent with the formal definition of Marxian la-
bor exploitation, it may be still unclear on why unequal labor transfers across
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nations should be considered a manifestation of exploitation in the Marxian
sense, though Marx (1968, chapter 20, (e)) and Roemer (1982, Chapter 1;
1983) also use this term in the same context of international economic rela-
tions. We will return to this question in Section 4.5.
4 Existence and Characterization of Free Trade
Equilibria with UE
Here we consider conditions which give rise to inegalitarian RSs. To do
so, we first classify economies into two types in Section 4.1, according to
the existence (or nonexistence) of essential technical differences among sec-
tors. We will also classify them according to their endowment of excessive
(or non-excessive) capital stocks. Then, Section 4.2 examines the existence
problem of inegalitarian RSs in economies with non-excessive capital stocks,
ω = A [I −A]−1 (Nb), and non-essential technical differences among sectors;
Section 4.3 examines economies with non-excessive capital stocks and essen-
tial technical differences among sectors; and Section 4.4 examines economies
with excessive capital stocks, ω ≥ A [I −A]−1 (Nb).
In the following discussion, without loss of generality, we remove any
subscript “t” whenever RSs are presented. As discussed in the proof of
Proposition 1 (see the Appendix below), the equilibrium price vector p should
be positive with p − pA > 0 at an RS, and its associated social production
activity vector is x∗ ≡ (I −A)−1 (Nb) > 0. Let 1
1+R
with R > 0 be the
Frobenius eigenvalue of the productive and indecomposable matrix A. Here
R > 0 follows from the productiveness of A.
4.1 Classification of Economies with respect to Tech-
nical Difference among Sectors
Let us classify economies based on whether essential technical differences
among sectors exists or not. It is given by examining whether the Frobe-
nius eigenvector of the Leontief matrix A and the vector of the labor input
coefficients L are linearly independent or not.
Lemma 1: Given an economy hN , (A,L, u) ,ωi, let a price vector pr =
(1 + r) prA + wL > 0 be associated with its unique equal interest rate r >
0. Then, pr is the unique Frobenius eigenvector of A associated with the
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Frobenius eigenvalue 1
1+R
such that pr is proportional to the vector of labor
values v if and only if prA and L are linearly dependent. By contrast, let
p = (1 +R) pA > 0 be the unique Frobenius eigenvector of A associated with
the Frobenius eigenvalue 1
1+R
. Then, for any r0 ∈ [0, R], p is the price vector
associated with the equal interest rate r0, that is, p = (1 + r0) pA+wL holds
for some w > 0 and is proportional to the vector of labor values v if and only
if pA and L are linearly dependent.
Lemma 1 suggests that if in an economy with the Leontief production tech-
nique (A,L), the unique Frobenius eigenvector p of A is linearly independent
of the vector L, then for any equilibrium price vector pr ≡ L (I − (1 + r)A)−1
associated with an equal interest rate r ∈ (0, R), prA and L are linearly in-
dependent.
Lemma 1 has some interesting implications. First, it classifies subsistence
economies with Leontief production techniques into two types. One type
are economies in which the unique Frobenius eigenvector p of A and L are
linearly dependent. In such a case, if every nation establishes a positive
wage rate in its domestic factor market under the international equilibrium,
a common capital-labor ratio is established among all sectors, evaluated by
the corresponding equilibrium prices of commodities. Thus, in this type of
economy, essentially no technical differences among sectors exists in that
the capital-labor ratios are common among sectors under all equilibria. The
other type are economies in which the unique Frobenius eigenvector p of A
and L are linearly independent. Here, technical differences among sectors
exist, in that the capital-labor ratios are not identical among sectors under
some equilibrium.
Second, in combination with Theorem 1, Lemma 1 offers the following ob-
servation. If the production technique (A,L) reveals that its unique Frobe-
nius eigenvector p and L are linearly dependent, then no price vector is
associated with an equal positive interest rate, except in cases of labor value
pricing (i.e., when the price vector is proportional to the vector of labor
value).
4.2 Egalitarian RSs in Economies with no Technical
Difference among Sectors
Given non-excess capital stocks ω = A [I −A]−1 (Nb), let us examine the
existence and characterization of RSs in economies with no essential tech-
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nical differences among sectors. Let us take any subsistence economy with
a Leontief production technique such that its unique Frobenius eigenvector
and its labor coefficient vector are linearly dependent. In such cases, at most
only egalitarian RSs exist.
Theorem 2: Given an economy hN , (A,L, u) ,ωiwith ω = A [I −A]−1 (Nb),
at most, only an egalitarian RS exists under the equal initial endowments of
financial capital, and no inegalitarian RS exists under any initial endowments
of financial capital if and only if the unique Frobenius eigenvector p > 0 of
A and L > 0 are linearly dependent.
Theorem 2, combined with Lemma 1, suggests that in any subsistence econ-
omy with no essential technical differences among sectors, the only available
type of free trade equilibrium is that of egalitarian RSs, which is realized
under the equal initial distribution of financial capital, and the equilibrium
prices of all such RSs are characterized by labor value pricing.
Note that Theorem 2 also suggests that international trade of commodi-
ties could be conducted among nations under egalitarian RSs, although no
nation can enjoy a strict gain from trade under such RSs. In such RSs,
every nation can choose an autarkic economy in that, if preferred, it would
self-produce and consume the net output b, by investing equally distributed
financial capital and equalized labor supply vb, which is, for every nation,
indifferent to its own production activities currently implemented under such
RSs. Therefore, no nation has a strong rationale to shift from autarkic ac-
tivity to free trade equilibrium.
4.3 Inegalitarian RSs in Economies with Technical Dif-
ference among Sectors
In the following argument, our main concern focuses on economies with tech-
nical differences among sectors, in which the existence and characterization
of RSs are examined. Let us take any subsistence economy with a Leontief
production technique (A,L) such that its unique Frobenius eigenvector and
its labor coefficient vector are linearly independent. From Lemma 1, this
case is equivalent to the case that for any r ∈ (0, R), its associated price
vector pr = L (I − (1 + r)A)−1 has the property that pr and L are linearly
independent, which is equivalent to the property that pr (I −A) and prA are
linearly independent. Therefore, Theorem 1 suggests that in incompletely
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specialized RSs, every nation’s factor prices must be equalized, meaning that
to examine the existence of equilibrium price vectors in such equilibria, it is
sufficient to focus only on the types of pr = L (I − (1 + r)A)−1.
Let ω = A [I −A]−1 (Nb). For each r ∈ (0, R), let pr ≡ L (I − (1 + r)A)−1.
We would like to identify the domain of wealth distributions over which RSs
with incomplete specialization can exist. To do so, first, we will identify the
minimal value, say θr, of individual wealth shares with respect to the price
vector pr, such that an agent with this share of wealth can find a feasible
action. Here, the feasible action implies that this agent can purchase the
subsistence bundle at price pr by supplying some labor hours equal to or less
than unity. Second, by varying r ∈ (0, R), we will identify the minimal value,
say θ, of the wealth sharing among all values in {θr | r ∈ (0, R)}. Then, we
will show that any distribution of wealth (W ν)ν∈N ∈ RN+ ensures the exis-
tence of incompletely specialized RSs if the minimal share rate within this
distribution is larger than θ.
Let us discuss these steps formally. For each given θ ∈ [0, 1], consider
a non-negative and non-zero vector x ∈ Rn+ in order to solve the following
system of equations: ⎧
⎨
⎩
prAx = θprω;
pr (I −A)x = prb;
Lx ∈ [0, 1] .
Denote the set of solutions for this system of equations by Xr (θ) with the
generic element xr (θ). Then, define the following program:
min
θ∈[0,1]
θ, subject to Xr (θ) 6= ∅. (*)
Note that ∪θ∈[0,1]Xr (θ) is non-empty, since for θ = 1N , x (θ) = (I −A)
−1 b is
the solution. Denote the solution of the program (*) by θr.
Then, we can define θ ≡ infr∈(0,R) θr. Let 4 (ω) ≡
©
p ∈ Rn+ | pω = 1
ª
and
4θ (W ) ≡
(
(W ν)ν∈N ∈ RN++ | minν∈N W
ν > θ,
X
ν∈N
W ν = 1
)
.
Finally, for notational convenience, let
Ω ≡
(
(ων)ν∈N ∈ RnN+ |
X
ν∈N
ων = ω & LA−1ων ∈ [0, 1] (∀ν ∈ N )
)
.
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Now, we are ready to show the existence and characterization of inegalitarian
RSs.
Theorem 3: Let an economy hN , (A,L, u) ,ωi with ω = A [I −A]−1 (Nb)
be such that the unique Frobenius eigenvector of A and L > 0 are lin-
early independent. Then, for any profile (W ν)ν∈N ∈ 4θ (W ) of the initial
endowments of financial capital, there exist (p∗, w∗, r∗) ∈ 4 (ω) × R++ ×
R+ and (ων)ν∈N ∈ Ω by which
­
p∗; (w∗, r∗) , (x∗ν)ν∈N
®
constitutes an RS
with incomplete specialization for the subsistence private ownership econ-
omy
­
N , (A,L, u) , (ων)ν∈N
®
, such that the following property is satisfied:
this RS is inegalitarian if and only if the profile (W ν)ν∈N features unequal
initial endowments of financial capital across nations and the equilibrium
price vector p∗ > 0 is associated with a positive equal interest rate r∗ > 0.
Theorem 3 implies that in economies with an essential technical differ-
ences among sectors, an RS exists in a broad class of initial distributions of
financial capital. This result is in sharp contrast to the case of economies
with no technical differences among sectors, where only the equal distribu-
tion of financial capital allows the existence of RSs. In addition, owing to
the broadly available domain of initial distributions, most RSs are charac-
terized as free trade equilibria derived from the unequal initial distribution
of financial capital. More interestingly, such RSs are characterized as having
international division of labor because of the unequal distribution of financial
capital. That is, relatively rich nations are more specialized toward capital-
intensive production activities, while relatively poor nations are more special-
ized toward labor-intensive production activities, in that for any ν, ν 0 ∈ N
withW ν > W ν
0
, p
∗Ax∗ν
Lx∗ν >
p∗Ax∗ν
0
Lx∗ν0 holds under the RS
­
p∗; (w∗, r∗) , (x∗ν)ν∈N
®
.
Such RSs are also characterized as involving UE, whenever their associ-
ated interest rates are positive. In particular, relatively rich nations supply
fewer labor hours than the socially necessary labor hours vb to produce the
subsistence vector b, meaning that they are exploiting, while relatively poor
nations supply more labor hours than the socially necessary labor hours vb,
meaning that they are being exploited. In addition, such RSs do not involve
UE whenever interest rates are zero.
Finally, in RSs with a zero interest rate, the international division of labor
occurs due to the unequal distribution of financial capital, even though labor
supply is equalized among nations. Note that a zero interest rate yields no
net reward for investing capital goods into the production process. Then,
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more capital-intensive activities cannot reduce labor supply for the nation,
and accordingly, labor supply is equalized among nations. Moreover, RSs
with a zero interest rate are also characterized by labor value pricing.
4.4 Egalitarian RSs in Economies with Excessive Cap-
ital Endowments
Since all arguments presented above assume ω = A [I −A]−1 (Nb), let us
examine the case of ω ≥ A [I −A]−1 (Nb). Note, if ω ¸ A [I −A]−1 (Nb),
there is no RS in subsistence economies. Therefore, the only remaining task
in characterizing the class of RSs is to check the case of ω ≥ A [I −A]−1 (Nb).
Theorem 4: Let an economy hN , (A,L, u) ,ωi be such that ω ≥ A [I −A]−1 (Nb).
Then, for any RS
­
p∗; (wν∗, rν∗)ν∈N , (x
∗ν)ν∈N
®
associated with a suitable
(ων)ν∈N ∈ RnN+ , p∗ = ςv holds for some ς > 0, and there is no exploitation.
Theorem 4 implies that in any subsistence economy with ω ≥ A [I −A]−1 (Nb),
no RS has exploitation and its equilibrium commodity prices are character-
ized by labor value pricing. This property holds regardless of whether the
equilibrium interest rates are positive. It is particularly interesting when p
and L are linearly dependent, since in such a case, an egalitarian RS with a
positive equilibrium interest rate can exist even under a suitable unequal dis-
tribution of wealth, as the RS
­
p; (w, r) ,
¡
x∗
N
, . . . , x
∗
N
¢®
with r > 0 discussed
in the proof of Theorem 4 (see the Appendix below).
4.5 Indeterminacy of Inegalitarian RSs by Competi-
tive Markets
In summary, Theorems 2—4 together imply that regardless of whether economies
involve inter-sector technical heterogeneity, any free trade equilibrium in-
volves exploitation if and only if this equilibrium is derived from an unequal
distribution of wealth, and the corresponding equilibrium prices deviate from
the labor value pricing.
Corollary 1: For any economy
­
N , (A,L, u) , (ων)ν∈N
®
with ω = A [I −A]−1 (Nb),
and any RS
­
(p∗, w∗, r∗) , (x∗ν)ν∈N
®
of this economy, this RS is inegalitarian,
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if and only if, (p∗ων)ν∈N is unequal and there is no ς > 0, such that p∗ = ςv.
In other words, even if an equilibrium price vector is associated with a positive
interest rate, it does not involve exploitation under the unequal distribution
of wealth whenever equilibrium prices are proportional to the labor values.
Such a situation is possible, according to Theorems 3 and 4. Therefore,
Corollary 1 implies that positive equilibrium interest rates and the existence
of exploitation are not necessarily equivalent–even under the unequal dis-
tribution of wealth.
Note that if a subsistence international economy entails non-excessive
capital stocks and essential technical differences among sectors, Theorem 3
and Corollary 1 suggest that the equilibrium transfer of labor across nations
is generically indeterminate, whereas, if the economy does not entail both,
Theorems 2 and 4 suggest that the exchange of labor among nations is equal-
ized in equilibrium. This indeterminacy implies that even if there are rich and
poor nations with a strong motivation to interact via competitive commodity
markets to gain from the international division of labor, these institutions
alone are insufficient for the realization of an inegalitarian RS: the egalitar-
ian RS may instead emerge through the competitive trade of commodities
between rich and poor.
In this situation, let us consider a counterfactual bargaining among na-
tions as one of the possible determinants for the selection of an inegalitarian
RS and for eliminating the egalitarian RS. For simplicity, let us focus on the
case of bargaining between two nations, the rich ν and the poor μ. Assume
that ων ≥ A [I −A]−1 b ≥ ωμ and ων + ωμ = A [I −A]−1 (2b). Therefore,
ν is sufficiently rich that it can survive under an autarkic economy, while
μ is sufficiently poor that it cannot survive under the autarchy economy.
Consider a Nash bargaining problem between these two, where if both par-
ties cannot reach an agreement on the selection of a proper RS, they must
exit international trade and return to autarkic economic conditions. In the
autarkic allocation, ν can have (cν, lν) = (b, vb), that is, consuming b and
supplying vb-labor hours, whereas μ simply dies because it cannot produce
the bundle b through its own autarkic production. In the option set of pos-
sible RSs, the egalitarian RS associated with the allocation of labor and
consumption, ((c∗ν, l∗ν) , (c∗μ, l∗μ)) = ((b, vb) , (b, vb)), is most preferable for
the poor μ, while there is an inegalitarian RS associated with the allocation,
((c∗∗ν , l∗∗ν) , (c∗∗μ, l∗∗μ)) = ((b, 2vb− 1) , (b, 1)), where vb < 1 < 2vb, in which
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ν enjoys the highest level of welfare among the options of RSs.1213 Thus, this
bargaining problem is given by a pair (S, d) of the utility possibility set S and
the disagreement point d, where S is defined as the convex-hull of the four
utility allocations u∗ = (u (b, vb) , u (b, vb)), u∗∗ = (u (b, 2vb− 1) , u (b, 1)),
u∗∗∗ = (u (b, 2vb− 1) , u (0, 0)), and d = (u (b, vb) , u (0, 0)).14 Note that
u (0, 0) represents the utility level of dying.
In this bargaining problem, ν can enjoy a stronger bargaining power than
μ due to the inequality of capital endowments between them, and since ν
can take advantage of this asymmetric power structure, the egalitarian RS
can never emerge as an equilibrium bargaining outcome. Indeed, none of the
representative bargaining solutions like the Nash, the Kalai-Smorodinsky,
and the egalitarian solutions can select the egalitarian RS as the predictable
outcome. For the rich ν is indifferent between the egalitarian RS-allocation
((b, vb) , (b, vb)) and the disagreement point allocation ((b, vb) , (0, 0)), and
even if the egalitarian RS is offered as their agreement, ν can reject this pro-
posal. In contrast, if an inegalitarian RS is offered as agreement, μ cannot
but accept this offer since the autarkic allocation resulting from the break-
down of bargaining would force μ to die. In other words, any bargaining
solution selecting the egalitarian RS must violate the strong individual ratio-
nality condition.
Though such bargaining is counterfactual, the logical consequence of such
a hypothetical scenario may give us a reason to infer that an egalitarian RS
is unlikely to emerge even though it logically exists. Furthermore, it also
suggests that the existence of an asymmetric power structure between rich
and poor nations would be indispensable for the logical generation of UE-
exploitation in free trade equilibria.15
12Remember that 1 is the maximum length of labor hours available to all nations.
13Note that in this inegalitarian RS, the equilibrium wage rate is insufficient for purchas-
ing the subsistence bundle, w < pb. This implies that in both nations, workers without
property cannot survive by their wage revenue alone, so that income redistribution policies
must be implemented.
14We adopt the Nash bargaining problem as a technically convenient reduced-form ap-
proach to some non-cooperative bargaining game. As is common in the literature on
non-cooperative implementation of bargaining solutions, all the representative bargaining
solutions should be understood as the equilibrium outcome of some underlying noncoop-
erative bargaining procedure.
15As Roemer (1982, chapter 1, pp. 44—45) points out, a (re)switching of the position
in wealth distribution between ν and μ may occur, according to which equilibrium price
vector is realized, unless ων ≥ A [I −A]−1 b ≥ ωμ holds. In this case, we cannot observe a
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In addition, this scenario of counterfactual bargaining may give us a rea-
sonable explanation of why UE-transfer of labor across nations should be
considered exploitative. As argued in the recent literature on exploitation
theory by Cohen (1995), Wright (2000), Vrousalis (2013), Veneziani (2013),
and Yoshihara (2015), the UE-transfer of labor among agents per se is nec-
essary, but the existence of an asymmetric power structure should also be
observed to diagnose such a UE-transfer as exploitative. In this respect, the
above bargaining scenario suggests the existence of an asymmetric structure
of bargaining power between rich and poor nations, which leads them to
equilibrium with the UE-transfer of labor from the poor to the rich.
Indeed, inegalitarian RSs observed in Theorem 3 can be worthwhile to
manifest as exploitative, according to Wright’s (2000) criteria. Wright (2000)
defines that exploitation exists if (a) the inverse interdependent welfare prin-
ciple,16 (b) the exclusion principle,17 and (c) the appropriation principle18 are
satisfied. We can test whether the relationship between the rich and poor
nations in inegalitarian RSs satisfies the three criteria. First, criterion (a)
is satisfied, since in subsistence international economies, the richer nation
under an inegalitarian RS enjoys better welfare by working shorter hours rel-
ative to the egalitarian RS, while the poorer nation lowers welfare by working
longer hours relative to the egalitarian RS. This situation crucially depends
on the existence of the poorer nation, which is excluded from access to capital
stocks sufficient for autarkic survival. It is only the richer nation, which can
specialize in more capital-intensive activities via the international division of
labor due to the existence of the poorer nation, which can only specialize in
more labor-intensive activities. Indeed, if the poorer nation exited the world
economy, the richer nation would have to expend the socially necessary labor
time vb to access the subsistence bundle, even though the richer nation may
coherent asymmetric power structure of bargaining between ν and μ, since the realization
of equilibrium price vectors is indeterminate, and no information is available on who is
richer or poorer in advance of the bargaining game. In such a situation, where ν becomes
richer at one inegalitarian RS while μ at another inegalitarian RS, it seems ambiguous if
the relationship between ν and μ is worth diagnosing as exploitative. This is why we focus
on of ων ≥ A [I −A]−1 b ≥ ωμ here.
16That is, material welfare of exploiters causally depends upon the reduction of material
welfare of the exploited.
17That is, this inverse interdependence of the welfare of exploiters and the exploited
depends upon the exclusion of the exploited from access to certain productive resources.
18That is, the exclusion generates a material advantage for exploiters because it enables
them to appropriate the labor effort of the exploited.
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be able to monopolize the most of socially endowed capital stocks. Thus,
criterion (b) is satisfied. Finally, it follows from the above arguments that
criterion (c) is satisfied in every inegalitarian RS.19
5 Concluding Remarks
This paper introduced subsistence international economies with Leontief pro-
duction techniques and examined the necessary and sufficient condition for
the existence of equilibria with UE, namely inegalitarian RSs. First, the
findings showed that if the social endowments of aggregate capital goods are
excessive relative to the minimal level necessary for the survival of the econ-
omy, then no inegalitarian RS exists, regardless of whether the distribution
of wealth among nations is unequal. Second, if the social endowments of ag-
gregate capital goods are equal to the minimal level necessary for the survival
of the economy, then inegalitarian RSs exist only under the condition that
wealth distribution is unequal, and essential technical differences exist among
sectors. Such a condition implies that each nation has a strong motivation
to participate in international trade based on the principle of comparative
advantage. In other words, a richer nation finds its comparative advantage
when selecting a more capital-intensive production activity, while a poorer
nation finds its comparative advantage when selecting a more labor-intensive
production activity. In summary, the existence of inegalitarian RSs is char-
acterized by the unequal distribution of wealth among nations and deviation
from the labor value pricing of commodities. These main results suggest
that the generation of inegalitarian RSs cannot be ensured by the competi-
tive mechanism of markets under unequal distribution of wealth alone, and
an additional scheme of bargaining between richer and poorer nations may
solve this indeterminacy.
This characterization demonstrates an interesting contrast with the Fun-
damental Marxian Theorem (FMT) (Okishio, 1963; Morishima, 1973), which
shows that the unequal distribution of financial capital and the positivity
19Note also that inegalitarian RSs would also be worthwhile to be exploitative, according
to Vrousalis’ (2013) definition of economic exploitation. Indeed, poorer nations without
their autarkic survivability are probably economically vulnerable to richer nations. Thus,
richer nations would regard bargaining with these poorer nations as the process through
which the rich instrumentalizes the poor’s economic vulnerability to appropriate (the fruit
of) the poor’s labor. For further discussion on Vrousalis’s (2013) notion of economic ex-
ploitation, see Yoshihara (2015).
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of profits are necessary and sufficient for the existence of exploitation in
economies with labor markets. Unlike the FMT, this paper shows that UE
is not generated in equilibrium with a common capital-labor ratio among
sectors, even if the equilibrium interest rate is positive and wealth distribu-
tion among nations is unequal. However, this does not necessarily imply the
violation of FMT in subsistence international economies, for two reasons.
First, the premise of the FMT is based on economies with labor markets,
while the characterization of inegalitarian RSs in this paper was established
in international economies without international labor markets. Second, the
FMT discusses the aggregate exploitation rate of the whole working class (the
class of agents endowed with no financial capital), while the characterization
of inegalitarian RSs in this paper could not refer to the exploitation status
of nations with no financial capital, since such nations cannot survive in sub-
sistence international economies. Thus, the main theorems of this paper do
not satisfy the premise of the FMT.
The analysis of the existence of UE in the free trade equilibria presented
herein is concerned only with the temporary features of international trade.
However, if intertemporal features of international trade were also consid-
ered,20 the existence of UE in dynamic free trade equilibria would have a
quite different characterization. Indeed, our companion paper, Yoshihara
and Kaneko (2014), shows that in subsistence international economies with
infinite horizons, whenever an essential technical differences exists among sec-
tors, inegalitarian RSs generically exist in every period, regardless of whether
the initial endowments of aggregate capital goods are excessive.21 By con-
trast, in subsistence economies with finite horizons and no discount factor–as
in Veneziani (2007; 2013)–there is no inegalitarian RS, regardless of whether
the initial distribution of financial capital is unequal, whenever the initial en-
dowments of aggregate capital goods are excessive.
Note also that this paper focused on international trade with incomplete
specialization in Leontief production economies with no option of technical
20Veneziani (2007; 2013) addresses the issue of the persistent existence of UE-
exploitation in intertemporal subsistence economies with labor markets.
21More specifically, assuming the maximization of the discounted sum of one-period
welfare as each nation’s intertemporal optimal decision, we find that under equilibria,
the aggregate capital accumulation path {ωt}∞t=0, starting with ω0, must fulfill ωt =
A [I −A]−1 (Nb) for all t = 1, 2, . . ., even if ω0 ≥ A [I −A]−1 (Nb). That is, the social
endowments of aggregate capital goods necessarily converges to the minimal level necessary
for survival at each period.
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choice. In such an environment, the factor price equalization holds, as shown
in Theorem 1. However, it is well known that once a model is extended to
allow technical choice, the factor price equalization may not hold in general,
as Metcalfe and Steedman (1972; 1973) and Kurose and Yoshihara (2015)
discuss. Therefore, if subsistence international economies with an option
set of multiple Leontief production techniques are considered, we could not
develop our analysis by relying on the factor price equalization as this paper
does, meaning that a new analytical technique for the subject would be
necessary. This interesting question remains for future research.
6 Appendix: Proofs
Proof of Proposition 1. As shown by Roemer (1982, chapter 1), 0 < Lxνt
holds for any ν ∈ N , since there is no labor market. From the definition
of (MP νt ), pωνt+1 = pωνt and pxνt − pAxνt = pb hold, as argued when (MP νt )
is defined. Therefore, p [I −A]
¡P
ν∈N x
ν
t
¢
= Npb and pωt+1 = pωt hold.
According to Definition 1,
P
ν∈N x
ν
t − A
¡P
ν∈N x
ν
t
¢
= Nb, meaning thatP
ν∈N x
ν
t = [I −A]−1 (Nb) > 0 because [I −A]−1 > 0. Then, from pxνt −
pAxνt = pb for any ν ∈ N , p [I −A] > 0. (Indeed, if pj − pAej 5 0, where
ej denotes the j-th unit vector, for some commodity j, then x
ν
jt = 0 holds
for any ν ∈ N by optimality, which is a contradiction.) Thus, p > 0 because
[I −A]−1 > 0. Then, ωt+1 = ωt = ω holds according to Definition 1(iv), and
from p [I −A]
¡P
ν∈N x
ν
t
¢
= Npb, [I −A]
¡P
ν∈N x
ν
t
¢
= Nb holds, meaning
that
¡P
ν∈N x
ν
t
¢
= [I −A]−1 (Nb) and L
¡P
ν∈N x
ν
t
¢
= Nvb. This finding
implies that (xνt )ν∈N is Pareto efficient.
Proof of Theorem 1. Note that at an RS with incomplete specialization, we
have for each ν ∈ N ,
p∗ [I −A] = rν∗t p∗A+ wν∗t L.
From the proof of Proposition 1, we know that p∗ [I −A] > 0 and p∗ > 0,
which also implies that p∗A > 0 by indecomposability of A. Then, we obtain
that, for each ν, ν 0 ∈ N ,³
rν∗t − rν
0∗
t
´
p∗A+
³
wν∗t − wν
0∗
t
´
L = 0.
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Take i, j = 1, . . . , n such that i 6= j and p
∗Aei
Li
6= p
∗Aej
Lj
. The above system of
equations implies that for each ν, ν 0 ∈ N ,³
rν∗t − rν
0∗
t , w
ν∗
t − wν
0∗
t
´ ∙p∗Aei p∗Aej
Li Lj
¸
= (0, 0) ,
where Li denotes the i-th element of L > 0. Since
p∗Aei
Li
6= p
∗Aej
Lj
for these
i, j, we have p∗Aei · Lj − p∗Aej · Li 6= 0. Then, the matrix
∙
p∗Aei p∗Aej
Li Lj
¸
is non-singular, and hence the row vectors (p∗Aei, p∗Aej) and (Li, Lj) are
linearly independent. Thus, (rν∗t , w
ν∗
t ) =
¡
rν
0∗
t , w
ν0∗
t
¢
. Note that this result
follows with respect to each ν, ν 0 ∈ N . Therefore, by fixing i, j, we have that
for each ν 00 ∈ N \ {ν 0},³
rν∗t − rν
00∗
t , w
ν∗
t − wν
00∗
t
´ ∙p∗Aei p∗Aej
Li Lj
¸
= 0,
which implies (rν∗t , w
ν∗
t ) =
¡
rν
00∗
t , w
ν00∗
t
¢
. Thus, (rν∗t , w
ν∗
t ) =
¡
rν
0∗
t , w
ν0∗
t
¢
for all
ν, ν 0 ∈ N .
Proof of Lemma 1. Let pr = (1 + r) prA + wL > 0 be such that prA and
L are linearly dependent. This finding implies that there exists ς > 0
such that prA = ςL. Therefore, pr (I −A) = (rς + w)L. Thus, pr =
(rς + w) v, which implies that pr is proportional to the vector of labor values
v. In addition, it follows that pr (I −A) = (r + wς−1) prA, meaning that
pr (I − (1 + r + wς−1)A) = 0. Therefore, since A is indecomposable, pr > 0
is the Frobenius eigenvector of A unique up to scale, and [1 + (r + wς−1)]−1
can be the Frobenius eigenvalue of A. By contrast, if prA and L are linearly
independent, then the vectors pr and prA must be linearly independent.
Then, it is impossible to have pr = (1 +R) prA for some (1 +R) > 0, which
implies that pr can never be the Frobenius eigenvector of A.
Let p = (1 +R) pA > 0 be the unique Frobenius eigenvector of A as-
sociated with the Frobenius eigenvalue 1
1+R
such that pA and L are lin-
early dependent. Therefore, there exists ς > 0 such that pA = ςL. Then,
for any r0 ∈ [0, R), (R− r0) pA = (R− r0) ςL holds, meaning that p =
(1 + r0) pA + wL for w ≡ (R− r0) ς > 0. Since A is indecomposable,
L (I − (1 + r0)A)−1 > 0 exists such that p = wL (I − (1 + r0)A)−1 holds.
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Moreover, since p (I −A) = RpA = RςL, p = Rςv holds, so that p is propor-
tional to the vector of labor values v. By contrast, if pA and L are linearly
independent, it is impossible to have p = (1 + r0) pA+wL for some r0 ∈ [0, R)
and some w > 0, since p and pA are linearly dependent by definition.
Let4 (ω) ≡
©
p ∈ Rn+ | pω = 1
ª
for ω ≡ A [I −A]−1 (Nb) and let4 (W ) ≡©
(W )ν∈N ∈ RN++ |
P
ν∈N W
ν = 1
ª
.
Proof of Theorem 2. Given the technology (A,L), let us consider p (I − (1 +R)A) =
0, where 1
1+R
is the unique Frobenius eigenvalue of A and p > 0 is its as-
sociated eigenvector uniquely up to scale. Therefore, let us suppose that
p ∈ 4 (ω). By definition, the row vectors p and pA are linearly dependent.
Then, if the two row vectors pA and L are linearly dependent, which is
derived from the linear dependency of p and L, then a pair of p and any
allocation (xν)ν∈N satisfying (I −A)
¡P
ν∈N x
ν¢ = Nb and Lxν = vb can
constitute an egalitarian RS in an economy with equal initial endowments
of financial capital (W ν)ν∈N =
¡
1
N
, . . . , 1
N
¢
, and no other RS is in an econ-
omy with any initial endowments of financial capital. This situation occurs
because p (I −A) and pA are linearly dependent and thus the hyperplanes©
x ∈ Rn+ | p (I −A)x = pb
ª
and
©
x ∈ Rn+ | pAx = pωN
ª
coincide. Therefore,
if wealth endowments are unequal, there is at least one nation ν ∈ N
such that W ν < 1
N
, meaning that this agent’s set
©
x ∈ Rn+ | pAx 5W ν
ª
of capital-constrained feasible activities is included in the strictly lower con-
tour set
©
x ∈ Rn+ | p (I −A)x < pb
ª
, which implies that this nation has no
feasible production activity. By contrast, since p (I −A) and L are linearly
dependent, the hyperplane
©
x ∈ Rn+ | p (I −A)x = pb
ª
and an indifference
surface
©
x ∈ Rn+ | Lx = L (I −A)−1 b
ª
coincide. Therefore, any point in©
x ∈ Rn+ | p (I −A)x = pb
ª
can constitute a solution to the optimization
program (MP νt ) for any nation under the equal initial endowments of finan-
cial capital (W ν)ν∈N =
¡
1
N
, . . . , 1
N
¢
∈ 4 (W ), which implies that any nation
can realize Lxν = vb as its optimal labor supply. Therefore,
¡
p, (xν)ν∈N
¢
∈
4 (ω)×RnN+ with (I −A)
¡P
ν∈N x
ν¢ = Nb and Lxν = vb for all ν ∈ N can
constitute an egalitarian RS in an economy with (W ν)ν∈N =
¡
1
N
, . . . , 1
N
¢
,
and there is no inegalitarian RS in such an economy.
Moreover, if p and L are linearly dependent, Lemma 1 implies that p
can be any equilibrium price vector associated with any equal interest rate
r ∈ [0, R), which is proportional to the labor value vector v. In combination
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with the previous analysis, this finding further implies that in an economy
with the linear dependency of p and L, the only available types of RSs are
egalitarian associated with the equal initial endowments of financial capital,
regardless of whether the associated equal interest rate is positive.
Next, let p and L be linearly independent. Then, pA and L are linearly
independent, since p and pA are linearly dependent by definition. In this case,
no RS corresponds to the price system p because no nation’s optimal solution
can constitute a feasible allocation. First, if wealth endowments are unequal,
there is at least one nation ν ∈ N such that W ν < 1
N
, meaning that this
agent’s set of capital-constrained feasible activities,
©
x ∈ Rn+ | pAx 5W ν
ª
,
is included in the strictly lower contour set©
x ∈ Rn+ | p (I −A)x < pb
ª
=
½
x ∈ Rn+ | pAx <
1
N
¾
.
Thus, there is no RS in such a case. Second, even if wealth endowments are
presumed to be equal, every nation is faced with the common set of feasible
activities
©
x ∈ Rn+ | p (I −A)x = pb
ª
, which is not identical to the indiffer-
ence surface
©
x ∈ Rn+ | Lx = L (I −A)−1 b
ª
, meaning that every nation ν
would choose the same activity x0ν = argminx∈Rn
+
; p(I−A)x=pb Lx to minimize
its own labor supply. Note that Lx0ν < vb for any ν ∈ N , since while
(I −A)−1 b > 0 holds, the solution of the program minx∈Rn
+
; p(I−A)x=pb Lx
should be a boundary point of Rn+, which implies that (I −A)x0ν ¸ b holds
for any ν ∈ N . Thus, the aggregate net output does not coincide with Nb.
Let us consider a case that, given p and L are linearly independent,ep (I − (1 + r)A) − wL = 0 for some ep ∈ 4 (ω), some r ∈ [0, R), and some
w > 0. Note that such a price vector (ep, w, r) exists because of the produc-
tiveness and indecomposability of A. If epA and L are linearly dependent,
then from Lemma 1, ep is identical to the Frobenius eigenvector of A uniquely
up to scale, meaning that pA and L are linearly dependent, which is a con-
tradiction. Thus, epA and L are linearly independent. Then, according to
Lemma 1, ep cannot be proportional to v. This finding implies that r > 0
must hold, since ep (I −A) − wL = 0 implies p
w
= v, where w is determined
to fulfill the gap between ep ∈ 4 (ω) and v. Then, since p and L are lin-
early independent, Theorem 3 shows that, given the suitable assignment of
ω among nations, (ep,w, r) can constitute an inegalitarian RS, which implies
that the desired result is obtained.
For Theorem 3, the following three lemmas are proven.
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LemmaA1: Given an economy hN , (A,L, u) ,ωiwith ω = A [I −A]−1 (Nb),
for any price vector p > 0 associated with its unique equal profit rate
r ∈ [0, R), if there is no ς > 0 such that p (I −A) = ςpA, it follows that
x∗ is a solution to the following program:
min
Lx∈[0,N ]
Lx, subject to p (I −A)x = pNb; pAx 5 pω. (A.1)
Proof. Let p ∈ Rn++ be a price vector such that there exists r ∈ [0, R) with
p = L (I − (1 + r)A)−1, where 0 < 1
1+R
< 1 is the unique Frobenius eigen-
value associated withA. Then, define Y1 (p) ≡
©
x ∈ Rn+ | p (I −A)x = pNb
ª
and Y2 (p) ≡
©
x ∈ Rn+ | pAx 5 pω
ª
. Note that p (I −A) x∗ = pNb and
pAx∗ = pω, thus x∗ ∈ Y1 (p) ∩ Y2 (p).
If r = 0, then p is proportional to v, which implies that there is some
ς > 0 such that p (I −A) = ςv (I −A) = ςL, meaning that the hyperplane©
x ∈ Rn+ | p (I −A)x = pNb
ª
and the indifference surface ©x ∈ Rn+ | Lx = Nvbª
coincide. Therefore, if r = 0, x∗ is an optimal solution, since any activity
x ∈ Rn+ with Lx < Lx∗ = Nvb implies p (I −A)x < pNb.
Next, consider r > 0. In this case, if x ∈ Y1 (p) ∩ Y2 (p) is pAx 5 pω and
p (I −A)x > pNb, then for some small positive vector ε > 0, pA (x− ε) <
pω, p (I −A) (x− ε) = pNb, and L (x− ε) < Lx hold. Thus, x cannot be
an optimal solution. Therefore, if x ∈ Y1 (p) ∩ Y2 (p) is an optimal solution
to the program (A.1), then p (I −A)x = pNb holds. Suppose that x∗ is not
an optimal solution to the program (A.1). Then, there should be another
activity vector x0 ∈ Y1 (p) ∩ Y2 (p) such that Lx0 < Lx∗. Since p (I −A)x0 =
pNb = p (I −A)x∗, pAx0 5 pω = pAx∗, and Lx0 < Lx∗, it follows that
[p (I −A)− rpA− L] (x0 − x∗) > 0. However, since p (I −A)− rpA−L = 0
by definition, the aforementioned inequality is impossible. Thus, there is no
such x0, and x∗ is a solution to the program (A.1).
LemmaA2: Given an economy hN , (A,L, u) ,ωiwith ω = A [I −A]−1 (Nb),
let a price vector p > 0 be associated with its unique equal interest rate
r ∈ [0, R) such that there is no ς > 0 satisfying p (I −A) = ςpA. Moreover,
let xν ∈ Rn+ be such that p (I −A)xν = pb. Then, there exists ων ≡ Axν
such that xνis a solution to the following program:
min
Lx∈[0,1]
Lx, subject to p (I −A) x = pb; pAx 5 pων . (A.2)
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Proof. Let xν ∈ Rn+ be such that p (I −A)xν = pb and let ων ≡ Axν. Let
Y ν1 (p) ≡
©
x ∈ Rn+ | p (I −A)x = p (I −A)xν
ª
and Y ν2 (p) ≡
©
x ∈ Rn+ | pAx 5 pAxν
ª
.
Because of this supposition, the intersection Y ν1 (p) ∩ Y ν2 (p) has its interior
set int (Y ν1 (p) ∩ Y ν2 (p)). Then, as shown in the proof of Lemma A1, for any
x0 ∈ (Y ν1 (p) ∩ Y ν2 (p)) \ {xν}, if x0 is a solution to the program (**), then
p (I −A)x0 = p (I −A)xν and pAx0 5 pAxν. Suppose Lx0 < Lxν. Then,
[p (I −A)− rpA− L] (x0 − xν) > 0, which contradicts p (I −A)−rpA−L =
0. Thus, Lxν = Lx0 holds, since x0 is a solution to the program (**), which
implies xν is a solution to the program (**).
Given ω = A [I −A]−1 (Nb), let
Ω ≡
(
(ων)ν∈N ∈ RnN+ |
X
ν∈N
ων = ω & LA−1ων ∈ [0, 1] (∀ν ∈ N )
)
.
LemmaA3: Given an economy hN , (A,L, u) ,ωiwith ω = A [I −A]−1 (Nb),
let a price vector p > 0 be associated with its unique equal profit rate
r ∈ [0, R), such that there is no ς > 0 satisfying p (I −A) = ςpA. Then,
there exists a suitable profile (ων)ν∈N ∈ Ω such that LA−1ων ∈ [0, 1] and
p (I −A)A−1ων = pb for any ν ∈ N , and
¡
p, (A−1ων)ν∈N
¢
constitutes an RS.
In particular, if A−1ων0 6= (I −A)−1 b for some ν 0 ∈ N , then
¡
p, (A−1ων)ν∈N
¢
constitutes an inegalitarian RS if and only if r > 0.
Proof. From the supposition about the price vector, p = L (I − (1 + r)A)−1
and there is no ς > 0 such that p (I −A) = ςpA holds. Then, from
Lemma A1, x
∗
N
is a solution of minLx∈[0,1] Lx such that p (I −A) x = pb
and pAx 5 pω
N
. Take any profile (ων)ν∈N ∈ Ω such that LA−1ων ∈ [0, 1] and
p (I −A)A−1ων = pb for any ν ∈ N and A−1ων0 6= x∗
N
for some ν 0 ∈ N .
Then, for each ν ∈ N , let xν ≡ A−1ων. Lemma A2 implies that for each
ν ∈ N , xν is a solution of minLx∈[0,1] Lx such that p (I −A)x = pb and
pAx 5 pων. Since Pν∈N xν = A−1ω = x∗, ¡p, (xν)ν∈N¢ constitutes an RS.
Moreover, noting x
∗
N
= (I −A)−1 b, let us consider A−1ων0 6= x∗
N
for some
ν 0 ∈ N . Then, owing to the setting of p (I −A)A−1ων0 = pb, which is
equivalent to p (I −A)A−1ων0 = p (I −A) x∗
N
, the property A−1ων0 6= x∗
N
implies that pων0 6= pω
N
holds. Without loss of generality, let pων0 < pω
N
.
Then, there exists pων00 > pω
N
for another ν 00 ∈ N . Since pb = rpων + Lxν
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for each ν ∈ N , Lxν0 > Lxν00 holds if and only if r > 0. This finding implies
that
¡
p, (xν)ν∈N
¢
is an inegalitarian RS if and only if r > 0.
Before the proof of Theorem 3, let us show that θr is well-defined for
any r ∈ (0, R). To show it, let θr,b ≡ prb
prω . Then, the system of equations is
reduced to the form pr (I −A)x = prb = prAx with Lx ∈ [0, 1]. Let X
¡
θr,b
¢
be the set of solutions satisfying pr (I −A)x = prb = prAx. The set X
¡
θr,b
¢
is non-empty and compact. Since pb > 0, x = 0 /∈ X
¡
θr,b
¢
. Note that for
any θ < θr,b, no x ∈ Rn+ satisfies prAx = θprω and pr (I −A)x = prb, since in
such a case, the set of non-negative vectors, x ∈ Rn+, satisfying prAx = θprω
is contained by the strictly lower contour set of the hyperplane defined by
the supporting vector pr (I −A) at the point (I −A)−1 b ∈ Rn+. By contrast,
for any θ = θr,b, there is a non-empty set X (θ) ⊆ Rn+ such that for any
x ∈ X (θ), prAx = θprω and pr (I −A)x = prb hold.
Since each X (θ) is compact, we can find the solution to the program
minx∈X(θ) Lx whenever X (θ) 6= ∅. Therefore, the program (*) can be re-
duced to the following form:
min
θ∈[θr,b,1]
θ, subject to min
x∈X(θ)
Lx 5 1. (**)
Sinceminx∈X(θ) Lx is decreasing with respect to θ ∈
£
θr,b, 1
¤
andmin
x∈X( 1N )
Lx =
vb < 1, there exists θr ∈
£
θr,b, 1
N
¤
, which is the solution to the program (**).
Now, we can prove Theorem 3:
Proof of Theorem 3. Given the technology (A,L), let us consider p (I − (1 +R)A) =
0, where 1
1+R
is the unique Frobenius eigenvalue of A and p > 0 is its associ-
ated eigenvector unique up to scale. Therefore, let us suppose that p ∈ 4 (ω).
By definition, the row vectors p and pA are linearly dependent. From this
supposition, it follows that p and L are linearly independent. Then, pA and L
are linearly independent. From Lemma 1, p cannot be a positive price vector
associated with a non-negative positive interest rate r ∈ [0, R). In addition,
because of the uniqueness of the Frobenius eigenvector of indecomposable
A, no positive price vector p ∈ 4 (ω) associated with an equal interest rate
r ∈ [0, R) can be the Frobenius eigenvector, since the Frobenius eigenvector
p > 0 cannot be associated with a non-negative interest rate r ∈ [0, R).
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Therefore, according to Lemma 1, for any such p, pA and L are linearly
independent.
Let us consider r = 0, meaning that ep (I −A) − wL = 0 for someep ∈ 4 (ω). Then, as before, ep is proportional to the labor value vector
v, pw = v, where ew is determined to fulfill the gap between ep ∈ 4 (ω) and
v. Hence, there exists an RS even under unequal initial endowments of fi-
nancial capital and such an RS is always egalitarian. Indeed, in this case,
since ep (I −A) and L are linearly dependent according to ep (I −A)− wL =
0, the hyperplane
©
x ∈ Rn+ | ep (I −A)x = epbª and the indifference surface©
x ∈ Rn+ | Lx = vb
ª
coincide. Hence, for each nation ν ∈ N , the intersec-
tion of
©
x ∈ Rn+ | ep (I −A)x = epbª and ©x ∈ Rn+ | epAx 5W νª constitutes
the set of optimal activities at the price ep ∈ 4 (ω). Therefore, for any
(xν)ν∈N ∈ RnN+ with (I −A)
¡P
ν∈N x
ν¢ = Nb, ¡ep, (xν)ν∈N¢ can constitute
an RS if and only if there exists an assignment (W ν)ν∈N such that
xν ∈
©
x ∈ Rn+ | ep (I −A)x = epbª ∩ ©x ∈ Rn+ | epAx 5W νª .
This finding also implies that Lxν = vb < 1 for any ν ∈ N , from the iden-
tity of
©
x ∈ Rn+ | ep (I −A)x = epbª with ©x ∈ Rn+ | Lx = vbª, regardless of
whether (W ν)ν∈N is unequal. For instance, if (W
ν)ν∈N is equalized, then
xν = (I −A)−1 b is the unique optimal solution for any agent ν ∈ N . If
(W ν)ν∈N ∈ 4 (W ) represents an unequal distribution, but it meets the
property that minν∈N W
ν = minω5ω; LA−1ω=vb epω, then there exists a suit-
able assignment (ων)ν∈N of ω such that epων = W ν for any ν ∈ N and for
some (xν)ν∈N ∈ RnN+ , xν = A−1ων. By definition, epAxν = epων and Lxν = vb
for all ν ∈ N , which also implies ep (I −A)xν = epb for all ν ∈ N . Thus,
this RS is egalitarian, although its initial distribution of financial capital is
unequal. In such an equilibrium, international division of labor is generated
by the differences in the capital-labor ratios among nations. Because every
nation supplies the same amount of labor vb, W ν > W ν
0
implies that ν is
specialized to a more capital-intensive production activity than ν 0 is.
Let us consider r ∈ (0, R), which allows us to find a unique price vec-
tor pr = L (I − (1 + r)A)−1 > 0 and prA and L are linearly indepen-
dent, according to Lemma 1. By definition, (W ν)ν∈N ∈ 4θ (W ) implies
that there exists r∗ ∈ (0, R) such that minν∈N W ν = θr
∗
and for some
pr
∗
= L (I − (1 + r∗)A)−1, there exists x (r∗) ∈ Rn++ such that pr
∗
Ax (r∗) =
θr∗pr∗ω, pr∗ (I −A)x (r∗) = pr∗b, and Lx (r∗) ∈ [0, 1]. Then, there exist
p∗ ≡ 1
L(I−(1+r∗)A)−1ωL (I − (1 + r
∗)A)−1 ∈ 4 (ω) and (ων)ν∈N ∈ RnN+ such
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that p∗ων = W ν for any ν ∈ N . Let us define w∗ > 0 to fulfill the gap
between p∗ and pr
∗
as p∗ = w∗pr
∗
.
Since minν∈N W ν > θ, there exists (x∗ν)ν∈N ∈ RnN++ such that for each
ν ∈ N , p∗Ax∗ν = p∗ων, p∗ (I −A)x∗ν = p∗b, and Lx∗ν 5 1. From Lemma
A2, for a profile (ω∗ν)ν∈N ∈ RnN++ with ω∗ν ≡ Ax∗ν for each ν ∈ N , x∗ν is a
solution to the program (**). Then, since p∗ων = p∗ω∗ν for each ν ∈ N , x∗ν
is also a solution to the following optimization program:
min
Lx∈[0,1]
Lx, subject to p∗ (I −A)x = p∗b; p∗Ax 5 p∗ων .
Since x∗ν = A−1ω∗ν for each ν ∈ N , Lemma A3 applies, meaning that­
p∗; (w∗, r∗) , (x∗ν)ν∈N
®
is an inegalitarian RS if and only if (W ν)ν∈N is an
unequal distribution.
Proof of Theorem 4. Note that for any ω = A [I −A]−1 (Nb), the social
production activity
P
ν∈N x
∗ν of any RS is equal to x∗ = [I −A]−1 (Nb) and
its associated equilibrium price vector p∗ meets p∗ − p∗A > 0, according to
Proposition 1.
For the unique Frobenius eigenvector p > 0 of A, consider p and L to
be linearly dependent. Then, since pA and L are also linearly dependent,
Lemma 1 implies that any RS price vector is characterized by labor value
pricing. Then, for any (ων)ν∈N ∈ RnN+ such that vων = vAx
∗
N
for any ν ∈ N ,­
p; (w, r) ,
¡
x∗
N
, . . . , x
∗
N
¢®
with r ∈ [0, R) and w > 0 such that p = (1 + r) pA+
wL constitutes an egalitarian RS. In this case, there should be a nation ν
having pων > pAx∗
N
according to ω ≥ A [I −A]−1 (Nb) and p > 0. However,
x∗
N
is still an optimal activity for this agent.
Consider the case that p and L are linearly independent. In this case, we
cannot apply Lemma 1 and Theorem 1, since an RS
­
p∗; (wν∗, rν∗)ν∈N , (x
∗ν)ν∈N
®
under ω ≥ A [I −A]−1 (Nb) may not involve incomplete specialization. Ac-
cording to the definition of (MP νt ), we have p
∗ (I −A)x∗ = r∗p∗Ax∗+w∗Lx∗,
where r∗ ≡

ν∈N r
ν∗p∗Ax∗ν
p∗Ax∗ and w
∗ ≡

ν∈N w
ν∗Lx∗ν
Lx∗ . Therefore, if p
∗A and L
are linearly dependent, then Lemma 1 implies that pA and L are linearly
dependent, which is a contradiction. Thus, let us focus on the case that p∗A
and L are linearly independent. Then, whenever r∗ > 0, p∗ (I −A) and L
are linearly independent.
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Suppose that r∗ > 0. Note that x∗ is a solution to the following program:
min
Lx∈[0,N ]
Lx, subject to p∗ (I −A)x = p∗Nb; p∗Ax 5 p∗Ax∗. (A.1’)
Then, there exists x0 ≥ 0 such that p∗ (I −A)x0 = p∗Nb, Lx0 < Lx∗, and
p∗Ax0 > p∗Ax∗ because p∗ (I −A) and L are linearly independent, and x∗ =
[I −A]−1 (Nb) > 0. In fact, suppose that for any x ∈ Rn+\ {x∗} such that
p∗ (I −A)x = p∗Nb, if p∗Ax > p∗Ax∗, then Lx = Lx∗. This finding implies
that for any x ∈ Rn+\ {x∗} such that p∗ (I −A)x = p∗Nb, if Lx < Lx∗, then
p∗Ax 5 p∗Ax∗. Thus, if there exists x0 ∈ Rn+\ {x∗} such that Lx0 < Lx∗ and
p∗ (I −A)x0 = p∗Nb, then p∗Ax0 5 p∗Ax∗, which contradicts the fact that
x∗ is a solution to the program (A.1’). Therefore, for any x ∈ Rn+\ {x∗} such
that p∗ (I −A)x = p∗Nb, Lx = Lx∗ holds. However, since p∗ (I −A) and
L are linearly independent, this finding implies that for any x ∈ Rn+\ {x∗}
such that p∗ (I −A)x = p∗Nb, Lx > Lx∗ holds. Such a situation is possible
only when x∗ is in the boundary of Rn+. However, since x∗ > 0, this is
a contradiction. Thus, we must conclude that there exists x0 ≥ 0 such
that p∗ (I −A)x0 = p∗Nb, Lx0 < Lx∗, and p∗Ax0 > p∗Ax∗. Then, define a
convex combination x∗0 ≡ ²x0+(1− ²)x∗ for sufficiently small positive ². By
definition, p∗ (I −A)x∗0 = p∗Nb, Lx∗0 < Lx∗, and p∗Ax∗0 > p∗Ax∗.
Since ω ≥ A [I −A]−1 (Nb) implies p∗ω > p∗Ax∗, we can have p∗Ax∗0 5
p∗ω for a sufficiently small positive ². This finding implies that given a suit-
able assignment of x∗0 among the members of N , there should be at least one
nation ν ∈ N such that p∗ (I −A)x∗0ν = p∗b, p∗Ax∗0ν 5 p∗ων, and Lx∗0ν <
Lx∗ν. However, this is a contradiction, since
­
p∗; (wν∗, rν∗)ν∈N , (x
∗ν)ν∈N
®
is an RS. Therefore, r∗ ≯ 0 for an RS under ω ≥ A [I −A]−1 (Nb), mean-
ing that r∗ = 0 holds. Then, p∗ = w∗v. As shown above, such an RS is
egalitarian even for ω ≥ A [I −A]−1 (Nb).
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